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The Importance of Being Earned 
HOW ABATEMENT AFTER DEATH COLLATERALLY 
HARMS INSURERS, FAMILIES, AND SOCIETY AT 
LARGE 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a nine-year-old girl murdered, her father forced 
to amputate his leg, and the family faced with nearly one-and-
a-half million dollars in medical expenses. Now imagine that 
the person who caused this harm was convicted and ordered to 
pay restitution to the family, but—without any legal review—
the court vacated the conviction and the restitution order. 
These are the facts of People v. Schaefer.1 
With unreviewed vacations (or abatements) of convictions 
come many immediate and ancillary consequences that affect 
victims and third parties alike. Courts often issue restitution 
orders with criminal convictions to compensate victims for their 
losses. In many jurisdictions, when a court abates a conviction 
it also abates the corresponding restitution order, which denies 
the victim his interest in compensation. These immediately 
noticeable effects, however, are not the only problems caused 
by abatement. Essentially, when a conviction abates, all proof 
of the conviction and its consequences legally disappear,2 which 
affects the victim in subsequent civil suits and ripples the 
harm to collateral third parties. The absence of a criminal 
conviction creates unnecessary obstacles to meeting the burden of 
proof in a civil case. This can also create unpredictable results for 
insurance settlements related to the criminal conviction. Even 
though a defendant has been convicted beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and even though in most jurisdictions insurance does not 
pay for the wrong-doing of criminals and allows the insurer to 
seek indemnification from the wrongdoer through subrogation, 
abatement creates the possibility that insurers will have to pay 
  
 1 People v. Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (2012). 
 2 See infra Part I.C.  
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for the consequences of an insured criminal or that the insurance 
company’s ability to seek indemnification through subrogation 
will be diminished, which takes money out of the pockets of others 
insured by the company.  
Because there is limited legal guidance on what courts 
should do when a criminal dies before exhausting his right to 
appeal, the possibility of vacating punishment without review 
lurks behind every criminal conviction.3 This includes—but is 
not limited to—murder,4 fraud,5 and arson convictions.6 
Currently, only one jurisdiction in the United States has 
enacted legislation to address this problem.7  
There are three basic options of what to do when a 
criminal dies before exhausting his right to appeal: (1) abate 
the conviction; (2) stay the proceedings (essentially, refuse to 
abate or review the conviction outright); and (3) allow for 
substitutive appeal. Historically, a large majority of courts abate 
the conviction ab initio when a defendant dies before exhausting 
his right to appeal.8 Abatement ab initio9 acts to erase all 
  
 3 See infra Part I.A. 
 4 See, e.g., Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 501 (where the defendant was 
convicted of second degree murder and ordered to pay the victim restitution but died 
before appealing his conviction).  
 5 See, e.g., United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 870, 875 (2006) (where 
the court abated former Enron Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lay’s conviction of 
“conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud” among others crimes, when defendant 
Lay died before exhausting his right to appeal). 
 6 See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 411, 418 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (where defendant was convicted of arson (among other crimes) and ordered 
to pay restitution, and the court abated his conviction because he died before 
exhausting his right to appeal). 
 7 That jurisdiction is the State of Virginia. See Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 
S.E.2d 789, 794 (Va. 2011) (where the court notes in its analysis that “[i]t does not 
appear that abatement of a criminal case is addressed by statute in any jurisdiction in 
the United States” (citation omitted)); see also Tim A. Thomas, Abatement of State 
Criminal Case by Accused’s Death Pending Appeal of Conviction—Modern Cases, 80 
A.L.R.4th 189 (1990). Further, while the right to appeal is not granted in the 
Constitution, all jurisdictions have made post-trial review “an integral part of the 
adjudicatory mechanism” and most states grant defendants at least one appeal of right. 
See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to A Criminal Appeal, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 503, 576 (1992); see also infra Part IV.B (detailing the current status of 
abatement). Since the most recent update of the A.L.R., in February 2012, Virginia 
enacted a statute that adopted a procedure to follow when defendants die while their 
appeals are pending. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61.  
 8 See State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 760 & n.45 (Alaska 2011); see also 
Timothy A. Razel, Note, Dying to Get Away with It: How the Abatement Doctrine Thwarts 
Justice—And What Should Be Done Instead, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2196 (2007). 
 9 Ab initio means “[f]rom the beginning.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 5 
(9th ed. 2009). 
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evidence the conviction ever existed.10 When a conviction is 
abated ab initio, the appellate court “dismiss[es] the appeal as 
moot . . . and remand[s] the case to the [trial court] to vacate 
the judgment and dismiss the indictment.”11 For the purpose of 
this note, the phrase strict abatement ab initio means that all 
aspects of the conviction—including restitution orders and any 
proceedings leading up to the conviction—are erased when the 
defendant dies. Some jurisdictions apply looser forms of 
abatement ab initio where only the conviction and the 
proceedings leading up to the conviction are abated but the 
restitution order is not abated (or other slight variations of the 
abatement ab initio doctrine). This is detailed infra in the 
Appendix, Table 2. Jurisdictions that apply the abatement 
doctrine do so because they view the presumption of innocence 
to endure until a final review of the case, and they believe that 
anything short of abatement would unjustly harm the 
defendant’s family by forcing them to pay for the wrongs of the 
deceased defendant.12 While abatement accounts for the 
interests of the defendant’s family, it ignores the interests of 
the victims, their families, and collateral third parties.13 
Simply staying the proceedings and refusing to abate a 
conviction is not an adequate solution to the unfairness the 
abatement doctrine creates. In a minority of jurisdictions in the 
United States, the presumption of innocence is erased at the 
moment of conviction. This is detailed infra in the Appendix, 
Table 3. The presumption then becomes that the conviction was 
proper and the defendant is guilty unless proven otherwise 
through appeals.14 Jurisdictions that view the presumption of 
innocence this way stay the proceedings (refuse to abate)15 
when a defendant dies and do not allow the filing or the 
continuance of any appeals; any prosecutorial proceedings that 
were initiated before the defendant’s death abate.16 This 
practice is as unfair as abating convictions because instead of 
  
 10 See Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971), overruled in part 
by Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976); State v. Devin, 142 P.3d 599 (Wash. 
2006); see also Razel, supra note 8, at 2196. 
 11 United States v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 12 See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 13 See infra Parts II & III.  
 14 Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Miss. 1994); see also State v. 
Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 762 (Alaska 2011) (noting that to rely on the presumption of guilt 
violates defendants’ rights); infra Part I.B. 
 15 To stay means “the postponement or halting of a proceeding, judgment, or 
the like.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1548 (9th ed. 2009).  
 16 See, e.g., Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 413. 
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harming victims, this practice denies defendants their right to 
legal review, forces their families to pay untested restitution 
orders, and—like abatement—ignores possible harmful effects 
to third parties.17 
For the most part, a third doctrine—substitution—can 
solve all these problems by allowing interested third parties to 
substitute for the defendant in the appeal after his death. This 
doctrine, currently recognized in ten states, affords defendants 
their right to post-trial review, gives defendants’ families the 
opportunity to appeal the conviction and thus the restitution 
orders without unjustly forcing them to pay compensation to 
anyone, and mitigates the problems caused to third parties in 
subsequent civil proceedings.18 This is detailed infra in the 
Appendix, Table 4. Substitution also ensures that victims 
maintain the possibility of receiving restitution, allows the 
record to legally reflect the conviction’s existence for subsequent 
civil proceedings (like insurance payments), and mimics what 
might have happened if the defendant lived to see his appeal 
through.19  
This note argues for the application and codification of 
the substitution doctrine because of the important and 
resounding primary and collateral effects felt by victims, 
insurers, families, and society at large when they are forced to 
pay for (or denied payment from) an unreviewed conviction. Part 
I of this note describes the practices courts most commonly 
follow in the case of a defendant’s death before exhausting his 
right to appeal, and comments on the different positions courts 
take regarding abatement of restitution orders. Part II discusses 
problems that arise when a defendant dies while his appeal is 
pending and the trial process is stopped prematurely, including 
the harms it causes defendants, primary victims, and 
governments. For the purpose of this note, the term primary 
victims refers to the people who were directly victimized by the 
criminal act; primary victims include the person who was 
murdered, the person who was raped, the person who was 
robbed, etc. Part III of this note discusses the harm premature 
adjudication may impose on collateral victims, and specifically 
analyzes the effect of abatement on insurance companies and 
society at large. For the purpose of this note, the term collateral 
victims refers to all parties who are secondarily harmed by the 
  
 17 See infra Parts II & III. 
 18 See infra Part V. 
 19 See infra Part V. 
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judicial proceedings. Collateral victims are the defendant’s 
estate, the victim’s family, insurance companies, etc. Part IV 
discusses the current state of legislation regarding victims’ 
rights, the lack of abatement legislation (and its effect on 
victims’ rights statutes) and provides a state-by-state, circuit-
by-circuit overview of each jurisdictions’ current abatement 
practices. Part V offers a model substitution statute and 
illustrates that allowing an interested third party to substitute 
in the appellate proceedings is the only practice that 
adequately balances the interests of all parties involved. 
Ultimately, this note advocates for legislatures to codify, and 
courts to adopt, the practice of substitution when a defendant 
dies while his appeal is pending. 
I. ABATEMENT IN AMERICA 
In order to understand the fundamental differences 
between abatement ab initio, substitution, and refusing to 
abate it is simplest to compare the effects with an example. The 
following hypothetical was created for the purpose of this note.20 
A. Hypothetical Case and Potential Results 
Fred and Wilma, a married couple, have life and 
homeowner’s insurance. One day their house catches fire and 
Wilma dies in the fire. The police investigate and determine this 
was both arson and murder.  
A neighbor, Barney, is arrested and convicted of both 
crimes. He is sentenced to thirty years in prison and to pay 
restitution to Fred for Wilma’s life and the house. Barney 
appeals his conviction but dies shortly after the appeal is filed. 
1. Hypothetical Results of Abatment 
If Barney and Fred live in a jurisdiction that practices 
abatement ab initio, Barney (or, rather, his estate) is in luck.21 If 
the court were presented with his appeal, it would simply 
dismiss the appeal and abate the conviction. In most 
jurisdictions, even if Barney did not initiate the appeal the court 
would abate his conviction. Barney would be presumed innocent 
  
 20 The facts herein are loosely based on multiple cases and their results in 
different jurisdictions all discussed elsewhere in this note.  
 21 Because Barney is dead, it is actually his estate that will benefit. 
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because he did not exhaust his right to appeal and a person is 
innocent until proven guilty—not just at trial, but by also 
failing on all appellate attempts. The record would reflect that 
no conviction ever occurred and no subsequent criminal action 
could be brought against Barney for these crimes because 
Barney is dead. Barney’s estate would not be required to pay 
the restitution order for Wilma’s life or Fred’s home. Because it 
is possible that his conviction was in error, this result would be 
fair to Barney and his estate.  
Because Fred and Wilma had house and life insurance, 
Fred will be able to file a claim with his insurance company to 
recover for his monetary losses. But this means that the cost of 
repairs shifts to Fred’s insurer, who will be forced to compensate 
Fred for the harm allegedly caused by Barney. Theoretically, the 
insurance company could step into Fred’s shoes as subrogee and 
pursue Barney’s estate for indemnification of their expenses, but 
it could not use proof of Barney’s conviction to shift liability 
(because no conviction exists). Without a conviction, if the 
insurance company wants to be indemnified it will have a more 
difficult time proving that Barney was responsible for the 
crime and it will cost more for the insurance company to meet 
its burden of proof (where a conviction would essentially speak 
for itself). If the indemnification suit is unsuccessful then the 
insurance company (and the clients who pay premiums to that 
insurance company) lose even more money than just the 
compensation to the victim.  
2. Hypothetical Results of Staying the Proceedings  
If Barney and Fred live in a jurisdiction that refuses to 
abate convictions, it is Fred who is in luck (legally, that is). 
Following Barney’s conviction, Barney would be presumed guilty 
and his death would simply result in the dismissal of his appeal 
as moot without any change to his conviction. Fred would 
receive payment from Barney’s estate to compensate for the loss 
of his wife and home. This is fair to Fred because Barney was, in 
fact, convicted for the crimes against Fred and his family. 
Unfortunately for Barney (or his estate), this means 
that his conviction receives no review. If his conviction were in 
error, this can never be proven. Barney’s estate would be forced to 
pay the restitution orders to Fred even if Barney was innocent.  
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3. Hypothetical Results of Substitution 
If Barney and Fred live in a jurisdiction that allows 
substitution for posthumous appeals, everyone is in luck (at 
least as far as judicial fairness is concerned). Barney’s estate 
(or any other eligible third party)22 would be permitted to step 
into Barney’s shoes for the purposes of the appeal if they 
choose. Even if Barney did not file the appeal before he died, an 
eligible third party could choose to bring the appeal. The court 
would review the appeal as if Barney were still alive. If the 
court were to determine that there was no miscarriage of justice 
in Barney’s conviction, then Barney’s conviction and restitution 
order would stand and Barney’s estate would pay restitution to 
Fred. On the other hand, if the court determines there was a 
miscarriage of justice in Barney’s conviction, then the court would 
abate Barney’s conviction. Barney’s estate would not be burdened 
with paying a restitution order that was issued in error.  
B. The Development of the Abatement Doctrine 
The abatement doctrine is born from state and federal 
common law, and the lack of statutory codification leaves modern 
courts questioning their jurisdictional practices and continually 
changing their positions on abatement.23 The dilemma forces 
courts to consider whether justice is better served if courts stay 
proceedings or abate convictions.24 The varying interests of 
parties involved in litigations have called courts to question the 
  
 22 Note that the term eligible could vary from state to state. See the proposed 
substitution statute set forth in Part V.B. of this note for suggested eligibility guidelines.  
 23 See, e.g., State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 754 (Alaska 2011) (overruling 
Hartwell v. State, 423 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1967) and holding that substitution must be 
permitted after the defendant’s death “[b]ecause of changed conditions, including 
increased recognition of the rights of crime victims and rejection of abatement by some 
state courts”); State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967 (Haw.), opinion after reinstatement of 
appeal, 927 P.2d 419 (Haw. 1995) (overruling State v. Gomes, 554 P.2d 235 (Haw. 
1976), and holding that substitution must be permitted because “it seem[ed] 
unreasonable automatically to follow the abatement ab initio rule and pretend that the 
defendant was never indicted, tried, and found guilty”); State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 
135 (Idaho 2005) (overruling State v. Stotter, 175 P.2d (Idaho 1946), and staying the 
proceedings because abatement ab initio failed to recognize victims’ rights); State v. 
Benn, 274 P.3d 47, 49-50 (Mont. 2012) (overruling State v. Holland, 955 P.2d 164 
(Mont. 1998), and staying the proceedings because abatement ab initio failed to 
recognize victims’ rights); State v. Devin, 142 P.3d 599 (Wash. 2006) (overruling State 
v. Furth, 144 P. 907 (Wash. 1914), because abatement ab initio “conflict[ed] with 
modern laws that compensate crime victims for their suffering”).  
 24 See infra note 162; see also Joseph Sauder, Note, How a Criminal 
Defendant’s Death Pending Direct Appeal Affects the Victim’s Right to Restitution 
Under the Abatement Ab Initio Doctrine, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 347, 360 (1998). 
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purpose of criminal law, and the different answers to this 
question have shaped the current legal landscape of abatement.25 
In recent years, when faced with the issue, courts have 
been vocal about their reluctance to adhere to past precedent 
but have nonetheless adhered because of a lack of statutory 
guidance to do otherwise.26 An increased awareness of victims’ 
rights has started to show an impact on the approach courts 
use when faced with this problem. In the past decades, five 
state courts abolished the dated practice of abatement ab initio 
by overruling long-standing precedent that requires courts to 
apply the doctrine.27 Most courts, however, still choose to 
uphold the doctrine of abatement ab initio absent legislation 
ordering otherwise.28  
C. Abatement Ab Initio 
Abatement ab initio was the first procedure to develop 
in the event a defendant died before exhausting his right to 
appeal and is the most widely used procedure today.29 
Abatement ab initio acts to completely erase “not only the 
appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from its 
inception.”30 When courts strictly follow abatement ab initio, 
they vacate all penal, compensatory, and restitutionary aspects 
of punishments.31  
Abatement ab initio emerged in the early 1900s, from 
United States v. Pomeroy.32 In Pomeroy, the defendant was 
convicted of violating the Interstate Commerce Act and 
sentenced to pay a fine as part of his criminal punishment.33 
The defendant died before satisfying the restitution order and 
his executrix moved to abate the conviction.34 The court abated 
both the conviction and the fine, reasoning that “the object of 
  
 25 See infra note 162. 
 26 See supra note 23. 
 27 See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 28 See, e.g., Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 795 (Va. 2011). 
 29 See id. at 793. Though courts recently have begun to stray from abatement, 
it is still the most widely used practice today. For a comprehensive list of states that 
strictly apply abatement ab initio see infra Appendix, Table 1. For a detailed list of 
states that apply other forms of abatement, see infra Appendix, Table 2. 
 30 Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971), overruled in part by 
Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 31 United States v. Morton, 635 F.2d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 32 United States v. Pomeroy, 152 F. 279 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), rev’d sub nom. 
United States v. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 164 F. 324 (2d Cir. 1908). 
 33 Id. at 280. 
 34 Id. 
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criminal punishment is to punish the criminal, and not to punish 
his family.”35 In the years following the Pomeroy decision, nearly 
all state and federal courts confronted with this issue adopted the 
practice of strict abatement ab initio,36 as did the Supreme Court 
half a century later in Durham v. United States.37  
To the extent that abatement applied to writs of 
certiorari, however, the Court overruled Durham five years later 
in Dove v. United States.38 In Dove, the defendant petitioned the 
Court for writ of certiorari and the Court dismissed his petition 
because the defendant died before the petition went before the 
Court. In the years following the Dove decision, “the federal 
circuit courts have concluded that Dove did not abrogate the 
abatement doctrine entirely for criminal cases, but only for 
those cases that had concluded their initial appeals.”39  
Courts that continue to practice abatement ab initio do 
so because it protects defendants’ rights40 and protects 
defendants’ families from punishment.41 Today, twelve states, 
the District of Columbia, and seven circuit courts apply strict 
abatement ab initio.42 Six other states and three other circuit 
courts currently apply some other form of the abatement 
doctrine when a defendant dies while his appeal is pending.43 
  
 35 Id. at 282. But see infra note 162. 
 36 See Razel, supra note 8 at 2199-2203. 
 37 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971) (where the Court convicted the defendant for 
possession of a counterfeit bill and the defendant died while his appeal was pending), 
overruled by Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976). The Supreme Court’s decision 
to adopt abatement ab initio turned on the lower federal courts’ overwhelming unity in 
following Pomeroy. Id.  
 38 423 U.S. 325. 
 39 Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 793 (Va. 2011). Note that the right to 
appeal criminal convictions is not a right that is embedded in our Constitution, but a right 
that has developed in each jurisdiction over the years. See Arkin, supra note 7, at 576. 
 40 See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 41 See Crooker v. United States, 325 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1963). Some 
jurisdictions, though, take a strictly procedural approach and claim convictions must 
abate because the court no longer has jurisdiction over a deceased party. See, e.g., State 
v. Griffin, 592 P.2d 372, 373 (Ariz. 1979). This rationale is flawed, and ignores the 
rights of primary and collateral victims and forces their claims to fall silent. A court 
“obtains personal jurisdiction over a criminal defendant by the service of a summons 
and complaint or by arrest. Once personal jurisdiction is obtained over a party, it will 
generally not be lost as a result of subsequent events.” State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 
763 (Alaska 2011); accord FED. R. APP. P. 43; FED. R. APP. P. 12.1 (dictating that the 
“[c]ourt of appeals . . . retains jurisdiction unless it expressly dismisses the appeal”). 
 42  See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 43  See infra Appendix, Table 2. 
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D. Indefinitely Staying the Proceedings (Refusing to Abate)  
Another approach courts take when a defendant dies 
before exhausting his right to appeal is indefinitely staying the 
proceedings (refusing to abate). When a conviction is upheld 
without review, subject to jurisdictional rules, the estate is required 
to satisfy any monetary, restitutionary, and compensatory 
judgments ordered with the conviction.44 If the defendant 
initiated an appeal before his death, the court abates the 
appeal itself.45  
Currently, twelve states and one circuit court practice 
indefinitely staying the proceedings when a defendant dies 
before exhausting his right to appeal.46 Courts embrace this 
rationale because they view the presumption of innocence to 
stop at the moment of conviction.47 The presumption of innocence 
is replaced with a presumption that the conviction was proper.48 
Courts that stay proceedings and uphold convictions without 
review do so because it serves the victims’ rights by allowing the 
conviction to stand.49 
  
 44 See, e.g., Carlin, 249 P.3d at 762. 
 45 See, e.g., id. 
 46 See infra Appendix, Table 3; see also Carlin, 249 P.3d. at 760-62 (detailing 
that eight states currently dismiss appeals without review and two states, Alabama 
and Oregon, practice variations of the refusal to abate method). For examples of states 
that stay proceedings without review see State v. Bostwick, 740 A.2d 381 (Conn. 1999) 
(where the court held that the defendant’s death rendered his appeal moot); Perry v. 
State, 575 A.2d 1154, 1156 (Del. 1990) (where defendant died while the appeal of his 
murder conviction was pending and the court held that it was unable to hear the 
appeal because the court was “divested of its jurisdiction to proceed” upon defendant’s 
death); State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 135 (Idaho 2005) (where the court held that the 
defendant’s conviction and restitution order must remain after his death because the 
state’s substitution provision only applied in the civil context); Peters v. Michigan, 516 
U.S. 1048 (1996) (where the defendant died while the appeal of his first degree murder 
conviction was pending and the court dismissed his appeal because “[t]he presumption 
of innocence falls with a guilty verdict” because wiping out this kind of judgment for a 
reason other than a finding of error benefits no parties of the litigation and would be 
likely to “produce undesirable results in the area of survivor’s rights in more instances” 
than not); Royce v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Ky. 1979) (where the 
defendant died while the appeal of his manslaughter and robbery convictions was 
pending and the court held that an appeal would be improper because his death 
terminated the attorney client relationship, and therefore no one, including the Public 
Defender, had authority or standing to speak on behalf of the deceased); State v. 
Anderson, 314 S.E.2d 597, 597 (S.C. 1984) (where the court held that the defendant’s 
death when his appeal was pending was grounds for dismissal, and that the State 
Supreme Court substitution rule applied only in civil, not criminal contexts). 
 47 See, e.g., Whitehouse, 364 N.E.2d at 1016.  
 48 See id.; see also Nicholson v. State 254 So. 2d 881, 884 (Miss. 1971). 
 49 Cf. Carlin, 249 P.3d at 758-59 (noting that jurisdictions reject abatement 
because of victims’ rights). 
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E. Substitution 
The final common approach for handling the fate of 
convictions when a defendant dies before exhausting his right to 
appeal is to substitute an eligible third party for the defendant 
in the appellate proceedings posthumously.50 If a defendant’s 
eligible personal representative so chooses, he may bring (or 
proceed with) the appeal; otherwise, the conviction stands.51  
Today, only ten states permit a third party representative 
to substitute in appellate proceedings for a deceased defendant.52 
Courts that embrace substitution do so because the death of a 
criminal defendant does not necessarily render a claim moot.53 
Even after the defendant’s death, there are victims’ rights and the 
possibility of collateral consequences to consider.54  
F. Restitutionary Differences  
Courts differ in their positions on abating monetary 
punishments.55 Strict followers of abatement ab initio abate the 
  
 50 See e.g., Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 1045 (Md. 2006). 
 51 See id. 
 52 See infra Appendix, Table 4; see e.g., Carlin, 249 P.3d at 762 (holding that 
upon defendant’s death the defendant’s estate may substitute in the appellate process, 
but that to allow substitution without the consent of the estate could frustrate the 
interests of the estate and should not be permitted); Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297, 
1303 (Miss. 1994) (holding that while the State Supreme Court rule to allow 
substitution after a defendant’s death only specifically proscribes substitution in civil 
proceedings it does not prohibit substitution in criminal proceedings, and that so long 
as the substitution is made in a timely manner, any party may substitute in the 
appellate proceedings after defendant’s death as the appeal is an appeal of right); State 
v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996, 1004 (N.M. 1997) (holding that New Mexico’s Appellate 
Procedure rules allow substitution of parties upon a defendant’s death but “where no 
substitution is sought by either the court or the parties, the court [should] then abate 
the entire proceeding ab initio”); State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1987) 
(holding that because the State’s rules of Appellate Procedure clearly allowed 
substitution of parties, that the substitution of parties in criminal appeals after 
defendants die is permissible so long as the substitution is made in a timely manner); 
State v. Webb, 219 P.3d 695, 699 (Wash. 2009) (holding that substitution of parties is 
permissible in criminal appeals if filed in a timely manner, and if no application for 
substitution is filed then conviction and punishments remained intact).  
 53 See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 9 (1998). 
 54 See id. (holding that “[t]he possibility of consequences collateral to the 
imposition of sentence [was] sufficiently substantial to justify . . . dealing with the merits [of 
the case]” (quoting Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 484 (1957) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968). For a more 
comprehensive discussion on the collateral consequences of criminal convictions see Alec C. 
Ewald & Marnie Smith, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in American 
Courts: The View from the State Bench, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 145 (2008). 
 55 See United States v. DiBruno, 438 F. App’x. 198, 200 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing 
and comparing United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(where restitution did not abate), United States v. Johnson, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 
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conviction and the entire monetary judgment.56 Courts that 
distinguish between penal and compensatory restitution—that 
is, restitution ordered solely to punish the criminal versus 
restitution ordered solely to compensate the victim—generally 
abate penal restitution (regardless of the conviction’s abatement), 
but uphold orders for compensatory restitution.57 Other 
jurisdictions uphold the conviction because it acted as a 
punishment to the defendant, but abate all restitution ordered 
because enforcing the monetary judgment would punish the 
defendant’s family.58 Different still, some jurisdictions abate the 
conviction, but uphold the restitution.59 There are five states 
that do not fall into any of the three typical procedural 
categories of what to do when a defendant dies while his appeal 
is pending.60 
II. PROBLEMS CAUSED FOR PRIMARY PARTIES WHEN THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS IS STOPPED PREMATURELY  
Abating convictions without review and staying 
proceedings without review both stop the judicial process and 
deny parties rights that have been afforded to them.61 To abate 
a conviction without review is to say an appeal would have 
necessarily been successful, and all proceedings must adhere to 
the procedure of a successful appeal.62 To stay proceedings 
without review is to say the appeal would have necessarily been 
  
17204 (6th Cir. July 18, 1991) (where restitution did not abate)), and United States v. 
Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. Md. 1984) (where restitution did not abate), with 
United States v. Rich, 603 F.3d 722, 728-31 (9th Cir. 2010) (where restitution did 
abate), United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(where restitution did abate), and United States v. Logal, 106 F.3d 1547, 1552 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (where restitution did abate)).  
 56 See e.g., United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006); 
People v. Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (2012); Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 
789 (Va. 2011). 
 57 See, e.g., United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 1997), 
abrogated by United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2004); see also 
United States v. Asset, 990 F.2d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Estate of 
Parsons, 367 F.3d 409. Today, however, courts typically will not refund any amount of 
restitution paid before the defendant’s death. See Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 410-11, 413. 
 58 See United States v. DeMichael, 461 F.3d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n 
uncollected fine in a criminal case is comparable to the balance of the defendant’s 
prison sentence; the . . . fine, like the remaining sentence, abate[s] with death.” 
(quoting United States v. Morton, 635 F.2d 723, 725 (8th Cir. 1980)). 
 59 See, e.g., DiBruno, 438 F. App’x. at 199 & 203. 
 60  Alabama, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. See infra 
Appendix, Table 5. Six other states, Arkansas, Delaware, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Vermont, and West Virginia have not addressed this issue. Id., at n.lii. 
 61 See generally State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 762 (Alaska 2011). 
 62 Wheat v. State, 907 So. 2d 461, 462 (Ala. 2005). 
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unsuccessful, and all proceedings must adhere to the procedure 
of an unsuccessful appeal.63 But—without an actual appeal—
neither conclusion can be known for certain; and prematurely 
stopping the judicial process obstructs justice. This obstruction 
manifests in harm to primary and collateral victims of the 
defendant’s alleged wrongdoing.64 
A. Problems Caused for Defendants 
The United States’ criminal justice system developed to 
be protective of criminal defendants because the thought of 
wrongly convicting innocent people is reprehensible.65 Persons 
accused of crimes are afforded many rights and opportunities 
to prove their innocence,66 including the Constitutional right to 
a fair trial.67 Though neither the Constitution nor the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure grant defendants the right to 
appeal their criminal convictions,68 the right to post-trial review 
“has become an integral part of the adjudicatory mechanism of 
every American jurisdiction.”69 The right to appeal a criminal 
conviction is now an essential part of the criminal justice 
system and serves as one of a defendant’s most important tools 
to protect his due process rights.70 
Refusing to abate a conviction, and dismissing a 
defendant’s pending appeal without review, only recognizes the 
rights of primary victims and strips the defendant of his due 
process rights.71 This practice disregards the rights of the accused 
and potentially, of collateral victims.72 Courts refuse abatement to 
afford victims protection of certain rights and interests that 
society feels all people have earned by virtue of being citizens, 
like the right to dignity, the right to be heard, etc.,73 but every 
  
 63 See Wheat, 907 So. 2d at 462. 
 64 See generally Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 758-59. 
 65 See generally H. Patrick Furman, Wrongful Convictions and the Accuracy 
of the Criminal Justice System, 32-Sep. COLO. LAW., 11 (2003). 
 66 See id.  
 67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Thomas v. Wyrick, 520 F. Supp. 139, 
142 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff ’d, 687 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1982).  
 68 People v. Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160, 162 (Mich. 1995). 
 69 Arkin, supra note 7, at 576. 
 70 Razel, supra note 8, at 2202. 
 71 See United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684, 685 (5th Cir. 1980); cf. Razel, 
supra note 8, at 2213-14 (noting that many of the disadvantages of refusing abatement 
are the advantages of abating). 
 72 Id. at 2214. 
 73 See, e.g., State v. Devin 142 P.3d 599 (Wash. 2006). 
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person is granted the rights of due process and a fair trial,74 and 
these rights should not be ignored regardless of whether the 
defendant is dead or alive. 
B. Problems Caused for Primary Victims 
Criminal law has come to recognize that victims’ rights 
are an important aspect of the criminal justice system.75 This 
appreciation for victims’ rights began with the Civil Rights 
movement.76 Due to a rise in reported crime during the 1970s 
and 1980s, public opinion of victims’ rights changed drastically, 
and a community outcry for victims’ justice developed.77 When 
society realized that the criminal justice system ignored victims, 
several groups formed to advocate for victims and provide them 
with essential services.78 Today, many states have officially 
recognized the protection of certain victim interests; the 
conviction of criminals is an important tool to afford victims 
their rights.79 When courts abate criminal convictions, they 
  
 74 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 75 See State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 754 (Alaska 2011) (abolishing abatement 
ab initio and permitting third party substitution after a defendant’s death “[b]ecause of 
changed conditions, including increased recognition of the rights of crime victims and 
rejection of abatement by some state courts.”); State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967, 972 
(Haw.) opinion after reinstatement of appeal 927 P.2d 419 (Haw. 1995) (ordering 
substitution of third parties in legal proceedings instead of abatement ab initio because 
“it seem[ed] unreasonable automatically to follow the abatement ab initio rule and 
pretend that the defendant was never indicted, tried, and found guilty”); State v. 
Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 135 (Idaho 2005) (holding because abatement ab initio failed to 
recognize victims’ rights the conviction must stand); State v. Benn, 274 P.3d 47, 50 
(Mont. 2012) (abolishing abatement ab initio and staying the conviction because 
abatement ab initio failed to recognize victims); State v. Devin, 142 P.3d 599, 599 
(Wash. 2006) (holding that abatement ab initio “conflict[ed] with modern laws that 
compensate crime victims for their suffering”); see also David Cole, Who Pays for the Right to 
Bear Arms?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2013, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/01/02/opinion/who-pays-for-the-right-to-bear-arms.html; Ted Poe & Carolyn Maloney, 
SAFER Act Will Help Rape Victims Get Justice They Deserve, HILL’S CONGRESS BLOG (Jan. 
2, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/275211-safer-act-will-help-
rape-victims-get-justice-they-deserve. 
 76 Razel, supra note 8, at 2204. 
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. (citing Don Siegelman & Courtney W. Tarver, Victims’ Rights in State 
Constitutions, 1 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 163, 165 (1988)); cf. BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT., HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S.: LONG TERM TRENDS AND PATTERNS, available at 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); see also KATHERINE 
BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 3 
(1997) (discussing the changing views on crime and criminals); David L. Roland, Progress in 
the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer the “Forgotten Victim”, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 35, 36 
(1989).  
 79 Cf. Devin, 142 P.3d at 605 (where the state argued that it was harmful to 
abate because the potential collateral consequences felt by victims). 
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reimpose a burden on victims that legislatures intended to 
alleviate through these victims’ rights statutes. 
C. Problems Caused for Government 
The government has an interest in affording all citizens 
the rights granted to them and an interest in promoting 
fairness and consistency in the criminal justice system.80 When 
courts abate convictions without review, courts deny victims 
rights those victims have come to expect, and deny consistent 
application of the law.81 When courts stay convictions without 
review, courts deny defendants of rights those defendants and their 
families have come to expect. This may lead citizens to lose faith in 
criminal procedure and the government.82 Further, this may be a 
vehicle for setting irreversible and undesirable precedents.  
III. PROBLEMS CAUSED FOR COLLATERAL PARTIES WHEN 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IS STOPPED PREMATURELY 
Many parties are affected by criminal convictions, and 
because each case is different, each case produces a unique 
group of collateral victims. It is unjust to stop the trial process 
the moment a defendant dies.  
A. Problems Caused for Defendants’ Families 
When courts stay proceedings without review, 
defendants’ heirs may become collateral victims.83 And because 
a dead person cannot be punished—at least not terrestrially—
opponents of staying proceedings without review argue that 
anything other than abating the conviction does no more than 
punish the heirs of the alleged criminal and forces the heirs to 
“argue about a conviction that no longer exists.”84 This 
argument is flawed because without abatement, the conviction 
does exist and the consequences of it are real. In many 
  
 80 See Letter from George Washington to Edmund Randolph, quoted in THE 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 214 (1993) (“[T]he due 
administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good government.”). 
 81 See Douglas E. Beloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially 
Crafted Criminal Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1154 (2007). 
 82 See Furman, supra note 65, at 25.  
 83 See, e.g., Crooker v. United States, 325 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1963); State 
v. Jones, 551 P.2d 801, 804 (Kan. 1976). 
 84 United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (quoting 
United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 416 n.17 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
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jurisdictions, the estate is forced to pay all restitutionary 
judgments issued with the original conviction.85 If the appeal 
would have been successful, though, this restitution order would 
be vacated. Staying proceedings without review also ignores the 
interest of the defendant’s family to “preserv[e], unstained, the 
memory of the deceased defendant or his reputation”—and if 
the defendant really was innocent the family should have the 
opportunity to do just that.86  
Further, when courts stay convictions without review, 
the defendant’s estate becomes more vulnerable to civil suits 
connected to the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing. The burden of 
proof is lower in civil suits than in criminal cases and when a 
criminal has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in 
criminal court, the preponderance of the evidence standard 
required in civil court is already met.87 Neither a defendant, nor 
his estate, may deny the proven elements of his conviction in a 
related civil suit if the conviction exists.88  
B. Problems Caused for Victims’ Families 
When courts abate convictions ab initio, the victims’ 
families can be collaterally harmed.89 This can happen if the 
court abates a restitution order that was intended to make the 
victim, or the victim’s family, whole again. When courts order 
restitution, a property right is created.90 Like most property, 
restitution is inheritable.91 Even if the victim is dead, the right 
to restitution still exists.92  
  
 85 See Alexander F. Mindlin, “Abatement Means What It Says”: The Quiet 
Recasting of Abatement, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 195, 232 (2011). 
 86 State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65, 67 (La. 1976) (upholding strict 
abatement ab initio). Note that it is beyond the scope of this note to consider 
whether the party bringing the substitutive appeal should have the right to 
counsel, though cogent arguments could be made for both sides of that debate. 
 87 See Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 875 (internal citation omitted). 
 88 See id. at 874. 
 89 See Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 421 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3663A(a), (c) (2012)).  
 90 See id. 
 91 See id. 
 92 See id. 
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C. Problems Caused for Insurance Providers  
1. Effect of Abatement on Insurance, Generally  
Insurers can become collateral victims of abated criminal 
convictions because the absence of a conviction decreases the 
insurer’s ability to be indemnified through subrogation. With 
many criminal convictions, courts order restitution to victims to 
compensate for their losses,93 the losses are often monetary 
injuries resulting from the criminal activity.94 If the victim was 
insured at the time of injury, the insurer is the party that 
compensates the victim for that loss.95 At that time, the insurer, as 
subrogee, steps into the shoes of the victim and the insurer 
assumes the insured’s rights against the third party.96 As 
subrogee, an insurer can seek indemnification from the third 
party responsible for the harm.97 But if the conviction is abated 
without review, the insurer may experience the loss indefinitely 
because even if the insurer pursues indemnification as subrogee, 
there is no conviction to use as proof that the defendant was 
responsible for the harm.98  
When courts abate convictions, by nature of the 
insurance industry, the harm extends to other people insured 
by that insurance company and thus to society as a whole.99 
People enter into insurance contracts expecting the premiums 
they pay will help them (or others insured) in times of need, not 
  
 93 See, e.g., id. at 411; People v. Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 1284-85 (2012). 
 94 See, e.g., Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 411; Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
at 1284-85. 
 95 See, e.g., Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 411. 
 96 See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Cas & Sur. Co., 743 So. 2d 140 (Ala. 2002). 
For a detailed discussion on an insurer’s right to subrogation, see Johnny C. Parker, 
The Made Whole Doctrine: Unraveling the Enigma Wrapped in the Mystery of Insurance 
Subrogation, 70 MO. L. REV. 723 (2005). 
 97 See North Star Reinsurance Corp. v. Continental Ins. Co. 82 N.Y.2d 281, 
294 (“Subrogation, an equitable doctrine, entitles an insurer to ‘stand in the shoes’ of 
its insured to seek indemnification from third parties whose wrongdoing has caused a 
loss which the insurer is bound to reimburse; it allocates responsibility for the loss to 
the person who, in equity and good conscience, ought to pay it, in the interest of 
avoiding absolution of a wrongdoer from liability simply because the insured had the 
foresight to procure insurance coverage.” (citations omitted)); see also Schaefer, 146 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 1285 (before abatement). 
 98 Cf. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 422 (Dennis, J. dissenting) (because 
the conviction and the restitution order were abated, the insurance company never 
regained this loss).  
 99 Paying premiums distributes the risk of harm; it is a process where 
“individuals and organizations share the risk of misfortune. We each pay a little 
(sometimes not so little) so that there will be money to pay for the losses of the 
unfortunate few.” Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, 
Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1401 (1994). 
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in times of criminal activity.100 Presumably, others insured by the 
insurance company do not have a moral (or legal) issue with the 
company compensating the victim, but a problem develops 
when an insurer is not able to be indemnified for the proven 
criminal misdoings of an individual.101  
The insurance industry’s communal nature imposes a 
duty on insurers to limit the claims for which they allow 
recovery, or alternatively, to take on the costs of pursuing 
indemnification from a responsible third party.102  
Similarly, if the criminal is the insured party, the 
insurer should not be forced to pay for the damage the insured 
caused. Typically, insurers do not provide relief for intentional 
damage, and this makes it crucial for the insurer to determine if 
the damage was, in fact, caused intentionally.103 Public policy 
urges the refusal of recovery for the direct results of one’s own 
criminal acts.104 The reason that insurance contracts cannot 
compensate criminals for their intentional wrongdoing is because 
there is an “imposition of externalities on third parties [which] is 
a chief source of negative social costs from illegal contracts.”105  
When insurers are forced to compensate for the illegal 
acts of a client, there is a ripple of negative consequences, and 
others unnecessarily become collateral victims of the illegal 
acts.106 While direct and collateral victims of crime will always 
exist, abatement extends this harm further than necessary—
  
 100 Insurance is “[a] contract by which one party (the insurer) undertakes to 
indemnify another party (the insured) against risk of loss, damage, or liability arising 
from the occurrence of some specified contingency . . . . An insured party [usually] pays a 
premium to the insurer in exchange for the insurer’s assumption of the insured’s risk.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (9th ed. 2009); see also Baker, supra note 99, at 1401. 
 101 While it is true that insurers often are unable to achieve indemnification 
from the responsible third party—either because of the third party’s insolvency or 
another complication—that point is irrelevant to whether the insurer should be able to 
seek indemnification as subrogee in the first place. 
 102 See Deborah A. Stone, Promises and Public Trust: Rethinking Insurance 
Law Through Stories, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1435, 1443 (1994). 
 103 Cf. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 771, 798 (E.D. 
Mich. 1998) (citing Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co. 448 Mich. 395, 419 
(1995) (Boyle, J., concurring)).  
 104 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 582 (2013). But see Interstate Life Assur. Co. v. 
Dalton, 165 F. 176, 178 (6th Cir. 1908) (holding if there is not an express condition 
prohibiting recovery for such acts then recovery should be permitted).  
 105 Adam B. Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal 
Contracts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV 483, 493 (2009–10). 
 106 As discussed in the text accompanying supra note 105, insurance does not, 
as a matter of legal and moral principal, compensate an individual for his illegal 
misdoings. When a conviction is abated, however, the proof of illegality disappears and 
makes it less likely that the insurance company will be able to be indemnified by the 
defendant (or his heirs, rather) for his illegal misdoings. 
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that is, abatement imposes costs on insurers and other collateral 
victims—and presents courts with the task of determining the 
most just solution. Compensating for illegal acts relieves a 
barrier to committing crimes, facilitates criminal activity, and 
protects criminals from certain consequences like restitution 
payments and attorneys’ fees.107 When crimes become easier to 
commit, members of society are at a higher risk of being 
victimized by crime.108 Additionally, the premiums other 
(assumingly innocent) clients pay are used to benefit the 
wrongdoer (or, in the case of abatement, the wrongdoer’s 
estate).109 All these effects could potentially influence the 
decisions of people seeking insurance and cause them to seek 
alternatives, or to forego insurance entirely.110 Though it is true 
that people enter insurance contracts knowing that their 
premiums will go to pay for the harm caused to others, if 
insurance companies are unable to be indemnified for the harms 
for which they pay compensation, premiums will increase and 
other insured’s will bear this cost; “the business of insurance 
directly and indirectly affects all sectors of the public, business[,] 
and government.”111 These collateral consequences are only one of 
the many reasons that a claim is not moot simply because the 
defendant is dead.112 
  
 107 See 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 582. Note that the insurability punitive 
damages varies from state to state. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(2010) and N.Y. 
INS. LAW § 3420 (McKinney 2013) (Georgia permits the insurability of punitive 
damages where New York does not). But see Gollot v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297 (Miss. 
1994) (holding that abatement ab initio does not harm society because, “society needs 
no protection from the deceased, nor can the deceased be rehabilitated . . . [and] 
potential criminals will be no less deterred from committing crimes”). 
 108 Cf. Frank G. Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims of Crime: A 
Common Sense Approach, 35 VAND. L. REV. 587, 588 (1982) (arguing the value of 
deterrence is how it “affects the future conduct of the general public”).  
 109 See Stone, supra note 102, at 1443 (“[P]remiums will compensate the losses 
of other policyholders.”). 
 110 Cf. id. (highlighting that insurers purposely try to disguise “the 
multilateral nature of insurance contracts” because people like to think they are paying 
for their own risk; not the risk of others). But see Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dreeben, 20 
F.2d 394, 394-95 (N.D. Tex. 1927) (holding that if insurance is too strictly regulated 
people may not want to obtain it). 
 111 N.Y. INS. LAW § 401(a).  
 112 See id.; see also United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1997), 
abrogated by United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2004); accord Lance 
Duroni, Insurer, Ex-Enron Chairman’s Widow Settle Annuity Dispute, LAW360 (Aug. 13, 
2012 8:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/369357/insurer-ex-enron-chairman-s-widow-
settle-annuity-dispute.  
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2. Effect of Abatement on Life Insurance 
The effects of abatement on life insurance exemplify the 
need for an alternative judicial process—one that does not 
prematurely stop the legal proceedings immediately when 
defendants die—when the wrongdoer is the beneficiary of the 
life insurance contract.113 Life insurance is “[a]n agreement 
between an insurance company and the policy holder to pay a 
specified amount to a designated beneficiary on the insured’s 
death.”114 Essentially anyone with an insurable interest may take 
out an insurance policy on the life of any other individual.115  
Allowing recovery for a contract taken out fraudulently, 
however, is prohibited.116 If a person with an insurable interest 
takes out a policy on another’s life with the intent to kill that 
other person and reap the benefits, recovery is impermissible; 
this is known as the “Slayer Rule.”117 
A slayer’s acquisition, enlargement, or accelerated possession of an 
interest in property as a result of the victim’s death constitutes 
unjust enrichment that the slayer will not be allowed to retain. In 
particular . . . , [a] slayer may not receive the proceeds of insurance 
on the life of the victim.118 
Courts and legislatures rationalize the Slayer Rule 
because it is reprehensible to allow criminals to reap benefits 
from their own wrongs.119 Courts have sidestepped the issue of 
slayers’ recovery in the abatement context, however. For 
example, in State v. Krysheski, the court convicted the 
defendant of murder in the first degree, but the defendant died 
while his appeal was still pending.120 The State argued that 
abating his conviction would cause a significant problem in this 
case, and also in other cases where the murderer is the 
beneficiary of the victim’s life insurance policy because it would 
it would relieve a barrier to the estate of the wrongdoer 
  
 113 See, e.g., State v. Krysheski, 349 N.W.2d 729, 732 n.6 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) 
(the State’s argument), overruled by State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1988). 
While Kryscheski was overruled, this case exemplifies the insurance problem that can 
arise with abatement, and most jurisdictions still practice abatement.  
 114 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1010 (9th ed. 2009). 
 115 See Badawi, supra note 105, at 523.  
 116 See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social 
Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV 1489 (2010). 
 117 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 (2011). 
 118 Id. The term slayer refers to the person who killed the insured.  
 119 Nili Cohen, The Slayer Rule, 92 B.U. L. REV. 793, 797 (2012). 
 120 Id. 
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collecting on the insurance policy.121 The State raised this 
argument as a reason to stray from the doctrine of abatement 
ab initio, but the court quickly dismissed the concern in a 
footnote.122 The court instead held that “this consideration 
should [not] outweigh the policies of favoring abatement,” and 
reasoned that “[p]robate court proceedings would adequately 
protect a victim’s estate in this . . . situation.”123 While it is true 
that probate proceedings might allow the victim’s estate to 
recover the value of the insurance payments from the 
defendant, this act would simply shift who the recipient of this 
illegal payment was. The court here wrongly puts the focus on 
recovery to the victim’s family. It is not the victim’s family who 
had the foresight to take out insurance on the life of the victim, 
it is the slayer who had this foresight. The slayer should not be 
compensated by the insurance policy because the slayer took 
out this insurance policy fraudulently, but the victim’s estate is 
no more entitled to the insurance payments than the 
defendant’s estate. Even though the victim’s estate and the 
defendant’s estate may very well be the same people (for 
example, if a husband fraudulently took out an insurance policy 
on his wife’s life and then killed her), recovery should not be 
permitted. It is the insurance company that has to bear this cost. 
When insurance companies have to make payments in 
situations like these, it increases the premiums that other 
insured’s must pay and it undermines the integrity of insurance. 
But, in the absence of a conviction (resulting from an 
abatement), there is no legal reason to deny the defendant’s 
estate from collecting insurance proceeds from the policy taken 
out on the victim’s life.124 Once the conviction is abated, the 
conviction itself may not be used to prove the elements of the 
crime to assess liability in civil court so the insurance company 
will have a difficult time avoiding or being indemnified for such 
payments.125  
  
 121 Id. 
 122 State v. Krysheski, 349 N.W.2d 729, 732 n.6 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984), 
overruled by State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1988). 
 123 Id. 
 124 See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 425 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 125 See United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 874 (S.D. Tex. 2006). But see 
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012) (“A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United 
States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter 
shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense 
in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.”). 
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3. Effect of Abatement on Financially Insured 
Institutions 
Fraud committed against a financially insured 
institution may negatively affect the insurer. In United States 
v. Mmahat, two brothers held the positions of president and 
chairman of a federally insured institution, Gulf Federal Savings 
Bank.126 To maintain the revenue they personally received from 
the bank’s business, the brothers had the bank make “sham loans 
to shell corporations and loan swaps with other banks so as to 
conceal its weak financial position.”127 The result was “temporarily 
to decrease Gulf’s delinquent loan balance and inflate its income 
on its 1984 financial statements. Ultimately, their scheme failed, 
and Gulf went into receivership in November 1986.”128 The Fifth 
Circuit convicted the brothers for misappropriation of bank 
funds and ordered them to pay restitution to the insurer.129 One 
brother died while his appeal was pending, and his estate 
moved to abate his conviction and the punishment. The court 
held that to the extent the punishment was compensatory to 
the insurance company, the punishment would not abate; but 
to the extent the punishment was strictly penal in nature, the 
punishment did abate.130 
In Mmahat, the insurance company did not become a 
collateral (or primary) victim of the deceased defendant’s fraud 
because the court did not apply strict abatement ab initio, and 
recognized the insurer’s interest in receiving restitution. The 
court later abrogated the Mmahat decision, however, and 
adopted strict abatement ab initio as the Fifth Circuit’s 
practice, which subsequently forced contrary results.131  
4. Effect of Abatement on Fraudulently Received 
Insurance Settlements 
When a defendant dies after he has already received 
insurance proceeds and the court abates the conviction and 
restitution order ab initio, the primary and collateral victims 
include the insurance company, other insureds, and through 
  
 126 106 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1997), abrogated by United States v. Estate of 
Parsons, 367 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 127 Id. at 92. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 98. 
 130 Id. at 93.  
 131 See generally Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409. 
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them other members of society because this creates the need 
for higher insurance premiums to account for losses like 
these.132 Nearly two decades after its decision in Mmahat, the 
court abrogated its holding with United States v. Estate of 
Parsons, and adopted abatement ab initio as the practice in the 
Fifth Circuit.133 In Estate of Parsons, the defendant was 
convicted for arson. Before his conviction, he illegally collected 
insurance proceeds to cover his property loss. When the court 
convicted him, it ordered restitution of over $1.3 million dollars 
to the insurance company as compensation for the defendant’s 
fraud.134 The defendant died with his appeal pending, and the 
court abated his conviction ab initio.135 The court held that 
abatement ab initio vacated not only the conviction, but also 
the restitution order to the insurer.136  
IV. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS  
A. Victims’ Rights Legislation 
In recent decades, Congress has made an attempt to 
formally recognize crime victims’ rights through acts like the 
Victim Witness Protection Act,137 the Mandatory Victim’s 
Restitution Act,138 the Crime Victims’ Rights Act,139 and the Justice 
for All Act.140 Such statutes protect the essential rights society 
feels each individual has earned just by virtue of being citizens. 
These rights deserve recognition because “too often victims of 
crime experience a secondary victimization at the hands of the 
criminal justice system.”141 These acts formally grant victims 
necessary rights: the right to restitution in the “full amount of 
each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without 
consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant”;142 
  
 132 See infra notes 133-36. 
 133 Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 418. 
 134 Id. at 411. 
 135 Id. at 416.  
 136 Id. The court did not require the insurer to refund any payments the 
defendant made before his death. Id. at 411. 
 137 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. § 3771. 
 140 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat 2260. 
 141 150 CONG. REC. §10910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) 
(statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 142 United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 421 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § § 3663A(a), (c), 3364(f)(2)-(4)) (where the act mandates that the right 
to restitution is inheritable so “if the victim is deceased,” the victim’s family has the 
right to restitution). 
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the right to “be reasonably protected from the accused”;143 “[t]he 
right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the 
victim’s dignity and privacy”;144 and the right to participate in 
criminal proceedings,145 among others. 
Victims’ rights statutes do not limit protection to the 
primary victims of harm because there is an interest in 
“minimizing secondary harm from the criminal process.”146 The 
individual—whether it is an insurance company or another 
person—who compensates a victim for the loss addressed by a 
restitution order “may to the extent of the payment be 
subrogated to the victim’s right against the restitution debtor.”147  
B. Current Legal Landscape 
Virginia is currently the only jurisdiction in the United 
States that has a statutory procedure to follow when a 
defendant dies before exhausting his right to appeal.148 The 
highest courts in three other states—Hawaii, New Mexico, and 
Ohio—have each held that the states’ rules of appellate 
procedure that allow substitution in civil cases extend to allow 
substitution in appeals of criminal cases after a defendant dies 
while his appeal is pending.149 The highest court in Oregon has 
held that the state’s appelate procedure rules demand 
abatement of a criminal conviction when a defendant dies 
while his appeal is pending.150 Other than these exceptions, 
there is no statutory guidance for what to do when this problem 
arises. Because of the lack of statutory guidance, when a 
defendant dies before exhausting his right to appeal, the rights 
afforded to victims—even rights that are said to be 
mandatory151—are jeopardized.152 Some jurisdictions continue to 
  
 143 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat 2260. 
 144 Id. 
 145 18 U.S.C. § 3771. 
 146 Beloof, supra note 81, at 1150.  
 147 Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 422 (internal citations omitted).  
 148 See Thomas, supra note 7. Since the most recent update of this A.L.R. 
article, Virginia has codified the method of staying the proceedings (refusing to abate). 
See Abatement of Criminal Conviction; Effect of Death of Convicted Person While Case 
on Appeal, Va. Code §19.2-8.2 (2012). 
 149  State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967, 972 (Haw.) opinion after reinstatement of 
appeal 927 P.2d 419 (Haw. 1995); State v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996, 1003-04 (N.M. 1997); 
State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1987). 
 150  State v. Kaiser, 683 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Or. 1984). 
 151 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012) (Mandatory Restitution to Victims of 
Certain Crimes). 
 152 See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 663 (Ill. 1999) vacated, 719 
N.E.2d 662 (Ill. 1999); cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 530 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
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utilize the outdated method of abatement ab initio because 
stare decisis demands it, and a decision to stray from precedent 
is a decision best left to the legislature.153 Courts therefore 
refuse to acknowledge victims’ rights in the abatement context 
absent legislation specifically providing otherwise.154 This 
produces archaic results.155  
In 2011, the Virginia Supreme Court in Bevel v. 
Commonwealth, refused to dictate even a mandatory common 
law procedure when a criminal defendant dies before completing 
his appeal.156 The court held that it is the legislature’s place, not 
the court’s, to govern proper practices and procedures in 
criminal law.157 In Bevel, the court convicted the defendant of 
incest, and he died while his appeal was pending. The court 
noted that, in this particular instance, it was not contrary to 
justice to apply abatement ab initio because no collateral 
harms were immediately recognizable. But it held that because 
“[i]t [was] conceivable that . . . a criminal conviction could have 
a significant negative impact on a deceased defendant’s estate 
or the rights of his heirs or another party,” abatement ab initio 
was not appropriate in all circumstances.158 Because it is always 
conceivable that a conviction could have significant negative 
impact on other parties involved, it would be improper to have 
a rule that mandates abatement ab initio in all circumstances.  
Subsequently, in February 2012, Virginia enacted 
legislation that officially adopted the method that stays the 
  
dissenting); see also United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
The Lay Court recognized the rights of the deceased, the primary victims, and the 
collateral victims may be better served with permissible substitution but upheld 
abatement ab initio anyway because of stare decisis: “[A]llowing the estate to 
substitute for the dead defendant ensures the fair representation of the decedent’s 
interests, but such a substitution does not align logically with the abatement of all 
prior criminal proceedings.” Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 875. 
 153 See, e.g., People v. Schaefer, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 501 (2012) (upholding 
strict abatement ab initio because “neither the state constitutional provision 
establishing the right to victim restitution nor the statutory scheme governing victim 
restitution specifically addresse[d] whether a defendant’s death pending appeal abates 
a victim restitution order” (internal citations omitted)); Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 
S.E.2d 789, 795 (Va. 2011); see also United States v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th 
Cir. 2007) (where the court recognized the monetary windfall abatement provides 
defendants but upheld abatement ab initio because “binding precedent . . . require[d]” 
it to do so). 
 154 See, e.g., Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324. 
 155 Accord In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2012); cf. Wheat v. State, 907 So. 2d 461, 463 (Ala. 2005); State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 
758 (Alaska 2011). 
 156 Bevel, 717 S.E.2d at 795. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 795-96. 
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judicial proceedings after a defendant dies before exhausting his 
right to appeal (refusing to abate).159 While it is important to 
codify the procedure to follow when a criminal defendant dies 
before completing his appeal, it is equally important to enact 
legislation that produces the most just results.160 Substitution is 
the only method that adequately addresses the interests of all 
parties concerned.161 
 Tables 1-5 in the Appendix illustrate the different stances 
that each state and circuit takes on the issue of abatement. 
V. PERMISSIBLE SUBSTITUTION AS THE SOLUTION 
A. The Need for a Solution 
A defendant’s death while his appeal is pending poses 
the question: “What is the purpose of criminal law?”162 If the 
  
 159 Abatement of Criminal Conviction; Effect of Death of Convicted Person 
While Case on Appeal, Va. Code §19.2-8.2 (2012). 
 160 See Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Miss. 1994) (“If the abatement 
ab initio rule is perceived to be unjust, it is equally unjust to allow a conviction to stand 
and be used against the deceased’s estate for various collateral matters as if the appeal 
had been heard and the conviction affirmed.”). 
 161 See id. 
 162 Courts have tried to answer this question in the context of abatement. 
Compare United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1977) (upholding 
abatement ab initio because “the interests of justice ordinarily require that [the 
defendant] not stand convicted without resolution of the merits of his appeal, which is 
an ‘integral part of [our] system for finally adjudicating [his] guilt or innocence.’” 
(quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956)), and Surland v. State, A.2d 1034, 
1038-39 (Md. 2006) (upholding abatement ab initio because “the criminal justice 
system exists primarily to punish and cannot effectively punish one who has died” 
(quoting United States v. Estate of Parsons, 357 F.3d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 2004)), with 
State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 764 (Alaska 2011) (enforcing permissible substitution in 
criminal appeals because “[c]riminal administration [is] based upon the following: the 
need for protecting the public, community condemnation of the offender, the rights of 
victims of crimes, restitution from the offender, and the principle of reformation”), 
Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 794 (Va. 2011) (abolishing abatement ab 
initio (but declining to decide the issue of permissible substitution), the court held that 
“the criminal justice system does not only serve to punish, but it also serves to protect 
and compensate crime victims”), State v. Devin, P.3d 599, 604-05 (Wash. 2006) 
(abolishing abatement ab initio and staying the conviction because punishment of the 
offender is not the sole purpose of criminal law, holding that “[the] State’s goal is to 
ward off potential harm to innocent people”), Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 539 
(1998) (acknowledging that there is an interest in punishing offenders but 
distinguishing that the interest is shared by the “State and crime victims alike”), and 
United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1998) (refusing to abate 
restitution because “[i]t is separate and distinct from any punishment visited upon the 
wrongdoer and operates to ensure that a wrongdoer does not procure any benefit 
through his conduct at others’ expense”). Accord Lynn Johnston Splitek, State v. 
McDonald: Death of A Criminal Defendant Pending Appeal in Wisconsin—The Appeal 
Survives, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 811, 813 (1989) (stating that “[t]he purposes for 
enforcement of criminal laws are the punishment and reform of the guilty and the 
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purpose of criminal law is solely to punish the defendant, then 
abatement ab initio serves this purpose well because a person 
cannot be punished once he is dead. But the decades-long 
struggle to shift the focus of criminal law from a penal nature 
to a protective nature illustrates that this is too narrow a view 
because abatement ignores the collateral consequences that 
may arise.163 When punishment comes at too high a cost—and is 
punishment for punishment’s sake—then the fundamental 
underpinnings of any justice system have the potential to be 
destroyed. Criminal law is a tool to punish criminals and to 
make parties whole again;164 it is a tool to protect members of 
society and to make members of society feel protected.165  
When courts abate convictions, justice owed to primary 
victims is obstructed, collateral victims are created, and harm 
is extended. It is unreasonable, unnecessary, and unjust to 
ignore the rights of affected parties.166  
On the other hand, when courts stay proceedings 
without review, defendants’ rights are ignored and defendants’ 
heirs become collateral victims of the judicial process.167 Balancing 
defendants’ rights and expectations, victims’ rights and 
expectations, and members of society’s rights and expectations 
against each other is essential. Victims expect a restitution 
order at the moment of conviction, defendants expect the chance 
to appeal, and members of society expect justice in all 
  
protection of the public” (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65 (La. 
1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 163 See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 422 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(Dennis, J., dissenting); supra Parts II & III. 
 164 See supra note 162. 
 165 See People v. Robinson, 699 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (Ill. 1998), vacated, 719 
N.E.2d 662 (Ill. 1999). The court abated the deceased defendant’s conviction because 
enforcing the conviction of “a defendant who is no longer able to appreciate the benefits 
of such a ruling, would have a senselessly harsh impact upon the psychological well 
being of [the defendant’s] surviving family.” Id. On review, however, the court refused 
to abate the conviction because abatement would have a “senselessly harsh impact on 
the psychological well-being of crime victims and their families by implying that 
defendants have somehow been exonerated.” Id.; see also State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 
564, 567 (N.J. 1997) (where the court gave the “jury sufficient latitude to consider the 
decedent’s prior mistreatment and physical and psychological abuse of [his wife]”); 
supra note 162. 
 166 See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). But see United States v. Estate 
of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 2004) (expressing fear that the term “victim” 
would be misused and that a defendant would be wrongly convicted by trying to protect 
other parties from errors in the proceeding).  
 167 See Wetzel v. Ohio, 371 U.S. 62, 65 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) Justice 
Douglas noted the significant interest the deceased defendant’s heirs have to protect 
the estate: “If the conviction stands, those collateral consequences or penalties will be 
the likely reduction of appellant’s estate through the collection of costs from it.”  
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proceedings.168 These expectations, developed through state and 
federal common law, are consistent with the current justice 
system.169 A defendant’s death should not vitiate the rights or 
interests of any party affected.170  
Without written abatement procedures, too many people 
are left asking large, overarching legal questions.171 Neither 
crime victims, alleged criminals, parties with collateral 
interests in the outcome of a case, nor members of society want 
courts re-questioning the criminal justice system’s purpose 
during trial. Citizens deserve to know that there are practices 
and protocols in place, that those practices and protocols lead 
to the fairest results possible, and that our government officials 
are devoted to ensuring justice.172 Prematurely stopping the 
judicial process can offend the rights of parties on either side of 
the litigation, but there is no reason to offend the rights of any 
party after a defendant’s death because substitution recognizes 
the rights of all parties involved.173 A substitution statute 
resembling the model statute proposed in this note would 
protect the rights and interests of primary and collateral 
parties. 
B. Sample Substitution Statute 
Substitution of Parties in Criminal Appeals After Death 
(a) Procedure 
After a criminal conviction, if the defendant dies before 
exhausting his right to appeal, the case does not 
automatically become moot. Any eligible, interested 
party may elect to substitute in the criminal appeal. 
Should the appellate court elect to reverse the 
conviction on the substitutive appeal, the defendant’s 
conviction and all punishment ordered (compensatory, 
  
 168 Beloof, supra note 81 at 1135-36, 1153, 1158-59. 
 169 See id. at 1153, 1158-59. 
 170 Id. at 1159. 
 171 See Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 795 (Va. 2011); see also 
supra note 162. 
 172 Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 833-34 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 618 
(1983), and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972)) (noting that stare decisis is 
“not an imprisonment of reason” and that “however admirable [the justice system]’s 
resolute adherence to the law as it . . . a decision contrary to the public sense of 
justice . . . operates . . . to diminish respect for the courts and for law itself”). 
 173 See State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378, 380-81 (Ohio 1987). 
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penal, and restitutionary) shall vacate, and the record 
shall reflect a successful appeal in the same manner as 
if the defendant himself successfully appealed while 
living. If, however, the appellate court does not elect to 
reverse the conviction, the defendant’s conviction and 
punishment orders (compensatory, penal, and 
restitutionary) shall be upheld and enforced. 
Substituting parties may, however, elect to continue to 
pursue the appeal through the appropriate channels. 
The appellate court may not elect to remand the case. If 
a conviction is vacated the State may not retry the case. 
(b) Appeals Permitted 
A party may substitute in appeals of right and appeals 
of discretion. 
(c) Timing 
Substitution shall be valid so long as the substitutive 
appeal is made within 180 days from the last day the 
defendant himself or herself would have been permitted 
to bring the appeal were he or she still living. 
(d) Parties Permitted to Substitute 
Defendant’s successor, estate, representative, or any 
other interested party including, but not limited to, a 
public or private defense attorney may elect to 
substitute in the appellate process. 
C. Why Courts Do Not Adopt Substitution 
Many courts refuse to adopt substitution because, in 
their view, the defendant’s death renders the controversy 
moot.174 A moot case is “a matter in which a controversy no 
longer exists; a case that presents only an abstract question 
that does not arise from existing facts or rights.”175 Courts 
  
 174 See, e.g., State v. Krysheski, 349 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984), 
overruled by State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1988) (upholding abatement ab 
initio and noting abatement is not a comment on the defendant’s guilt or innocence, but 
“a return to the status quo before commencement of the case based on a determination 
to hold the case moot due to the futility of resolving the defendant’s appeal”).  
 175 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (9th ed. 2009). Mootness heavily relies on 
ripeness, defined as the circumstance existing when a case “has reached, but has not 
passed, the point when the facts have developed sufficiently to permit an intelligent 
and useful decision to be made.” Id. at 1442. 
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typically do not entertain moot cases. Nevertheless, there are 
many instances where courts are at liberty to hear “moot” 
claims.176 For example, courts may hear technically “moot” 
appeals when “collateral consequences arise from the 
challenged ruling”177—so that the claims do not “evade 
review.”178 One court went as far to as hear a “moot” claim 
because it could not be proven that no collateral consequences 
attached to the appellant’s order.179 Because it is impossible to 
see or foresee all collateral consequences, it may never be 
possible to prove that no collateral consequences exist. 
Critics argue that if a court did hear an appeal after a 
defendant died, it would be strictly academic or, alternatively, 
it could only punish the defendant’s family.180 First, while it is 
true some results cannot effectuate with substitution,181 (e.g., if 
the court orders a new trial or confirms the defendant’s prison 
sentence),182 this is outweighed by the benefit of the results that 
can be effectuated.183 The effect of abatement on collateral 
parties is not only relevant to consider, but also nearly 
impossible to ignore. Second, substitution does not punish the 
defendant’s family; it simply prevents them from receiving the 
  
 176 See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV 562, 563 (2009). The right to raise a mootness concern, however, is not 
waivable because it arises from Article III of the United States Constitution. See id. 
 177 In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 84 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) 
(civil case). 
 178 Hall, supra note 176, at 583. Further, in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 
(1975), the court held the Article III “live controversy” requirement of the Constitution 
“may exist . . . between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by 
the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become moot.” 
Essentially, recovery does not need to be to a primary victim of the wrongdoing but 
could be afforded to collateral victims. See id. Additionally, in New Jersey, the state 
constitution itself does not require that the controversy is “live” and the court 
entertains “moot” appeals if there is a strong public policy reason to do so. See 
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 371-72 & n.2 (1993) (holding that 
“reinstatement of the record of the charges against respondent would carry collateral 
legal consequences and that, therefore, a live controversy remains”). 
 179 In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 84 (where a mother 
appealed the termination of her parental rights of her severely disabled child but her 
child died while the appeal was pending). 
 180 Razel, supra note 8, at 2211, 2219. 
 181 See, e.g., State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65, 67 (La. 1976) (noting if the appeal 
was permitted and a new trial was ordered the new trial could not proceed because the 
defendant would be unavailable).  
 182 A trial cannot be held against a person who is not alive and likewise a 
person who is not alive cannot serve a prison sentence. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see 
also Mindlin, supra note 85 at 232. 
 183 See infra Part V.D. 
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windfalls of abatement.184 When a defendant’s estate is required 
to pay the defendant’s restitution order after his death, the 
estate is satisfying the order with the very same funds the 
defendant himself would have used to satisfy the order (if he 
were still alive). Because of this, the estate is not losing funds 
that would have rightly benefitted it; the order would satisfy 
the proper allocation of the funds (because the defendant would 
have allocated the funds to satisfy his restitution order). 
Abating such an order could create a windfall to the estate. 
Alternatively, if the defendant successfully appealed his 
conviction, the funds would not be allocated to satisfy the 
restitution order. Thus to stay the order could create a windfall 
to the victim or the victim’s estate. But if the goal of criminal 
punishment is to protect innocent people from undue harm 
then it seems inconsistent with this goal to protect the heirs of 
criminals but to ignore their victims.185  
Other courts refuse substitution expressly because there 
are no statutory rules providing otherwise.186 By codifying the 
substitution method, however, the possibility of these windfalls 
can be avoided. 
D. Why Courts and Legislatures Should Adopt Substitution  
Courts and legislatures should adopt the substitution 
method because a substitution method similar to the model 
statute posed in this note closely parallels what would happen 
if the defendant had not died. The interests that primary and 
collateral parties have in the conviction’s final ruling prevent 
the controversy from becoming moot.187 With substitution, 
parties can be afforded almost the same rights they would be 
afforded if the defendant were alive. 
  
 184 See, e.g., United States v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(where the court recognized the monetary windfall abatement provides defendants but 
upheld abatement ab initio because “binding precedent . . . require[d]” it to do so). 
 185 See State v. Devin, 142 P.3d 599, 605-06 (Wash. 2006). But see Whitehouse 
v. State, 266 364 N.E.2d 1015, 1016 (Ind. 1977) (“Although a criminal conviction 
carries a definite ‘fall-out’ that extends beyond the person of the defendant, we are 
aware of no right to be free of such, even if such conviction be erroneous.”). 
 186 See e.g., Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 795 (Va. 2011). 
 187 See State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 764 (Alaska 2011) (“The interests of the 
victim and the community’s interest in condemning the offender persist even after the 
defendant’s death.”). 
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1. Substitution Recognizes Defendants’ Interests 
Courts should not deny defendants their rights, even in 
the event of a defendant’s death. Refusing to abate ignores 
defendants’ right to a fair trial. Substitution, however, affords 
defendants the right to fair trials by allowing post-trial review 
of their conviction, and by maintaining their presumption of 
innocence.188 Though abatement affords defendants the right to 
a fair trial, abatement denies other parties essential rights; the 
model substitution statute would afford defendants the right to 
a fair trial without ignoring the rights and interests of others. 
One commentator has argued, however, that posthumous 
appeal ignores defendants’ right to a fair trial because it ignores 
defendants’ right to dictate how far to take the appeal process.189 
If the defendant is not alive he cannot exercise this right, but the 
role a defendant plays in criminal appeals is very limited.190 
There are likely few instances where a defendant would feel his 
rights were violated by a court reviewing his conviction. 
Further, because the model statute allows for parties to elect to 
substitute in the appellate process, it is likely that the parties 
would elect to do so, at least in part, to defend the defendant’s 
rights rather than to offend his rights. While it is true that 
defendants may have an interest in halting the appeal, most 
rational people would prefer the opportunity to have their 
appeal heard. 
2. Substitution Recognizes Primary Victims’ Interests 
Criminal defendants’ deaths should not impinge on 
victims’ rights. Substitution is necessary to afford victims their 
rights.191 States recognize the importance of victims feeling 
  
 188 Some jurisdictions view the enduring presumption of innocence to be a part 
of a defendant’s right to a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 
F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that it is consistent with the right to post-trial 
review that the presumption of innocence endures until the defendant has exhausted 
his right to appeal). 
 189 Razel, supra note 8, at 2218-19 (citing Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 
1041 (Md. 2006)). 
 190 For an example of why this is true, see FED. R. APP. P. 27 (ordering that 
“[a] motion will be decided without oral argument unless the court orders otherwise”). 
If oral argument is ordered and the appellant is not present at the proceeding the court 
may still hear the appellee’s argument; if neither party is present, the case is decided 
on the briefs prepared by the parties’ attorneys. See FED R. APP. P. 27 (cmts.). 
 191 Cf. State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 762-63 (Alaska 2011) (adopting the substitution 
method because both abatement and refusal to abate offend a party’s rights). 
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protected and redeemed by the criminal justice system.192 
Convicting criminals is an important tool to achieve this goal, 
but when courts abate convictions, victims are denied this right.  
First, while it may be possible for most parties to seek 
monetary compensation in civil court (where the burden of 
proof is lower),193 it is impractical to assume civil court 
proceedings will properly afford victims their rights because 
without a conviction the results of the civil proceedings are 
unpredictable. If substitution is permitted, victims have the 
same opportunity to use proof of the final conviction in civil 
proceedings as they would if the defendant were still alive;194 if 
the conviction were abated, the lower burden of proof does not 
ensure the victim a favorable result in civil proceedings.  
Second, this wrongly assumes the victims’ only interests 
are monetary; victims also have interests in being heard and 
having wrongdoers convicted, among other interests.195 Most 
importantly, substitution affords victims a form of due process 
without denying defendants that same right.196 Further, 
because interests in restitution are inheritable, substitution 
recognizes the victims’ families’ interests.197 Even if the victim 
is dead, the victims’ family still has an interest in a final ruling 
on the conviction—a right which substitution affords.198 
3. Substitution Recognizes Governments’ Interests 
Substitution also protects courts and government 
agencies. First, substitution protects courts from further 
unnecessary litigation.199 If the court allows the appeal to 
  
 192 For a more comprehensive look at how states balance victim’s interests in 
the criminal justice system see Beloof, supra note 81. The right to feel heard and be 
protected has also been granted federally. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 60.  
 193 United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006). This is 
because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure allow victims to bring claims against the deceased’s estate, and also permit 
interested parties to act as substitutes for the defendant if they file within a certain 
time. FED. R. APP. P. 43; FED. R. CIV. P. 25; FED. R. CIV. P. 25 (Comm. Notes); see also 1 
AM. JUR. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 50 (2013).  
 194 This is not possible, however, when the conviction abates because 
abatement ab initio treats the conviction as if it never happened. See United States v. 
Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 414 n.14 (5th Cir. 2004).  
 195 See supra Part IV.A.  
 196 See supra Part V.D.1. 
 197 See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 421 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a), (c) (2012)). 
 198 See id. 
 199 See Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297, 1303 (Miss. 1994). But see Razel, 
supra note 8, at 2210 (noting that it may waste the court’s time to hear such an appeal). 
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continue and the conviction is affirmed then it will not be 
necessary to initiate separate civil actions.200 If, on the other 
hand, the court finds a reversible error on appeal, a civil 
proceeding can be conducted to resolve any collateral issues.201 
Substitution cuts costs and promotes judicial economy.202 
Because the results of substitution closely mirror what would 
happen if the defendant never died, it promotes fairness and 
consistency in the criminal justice system and it provides a layer 
of protection that avoids setting irreversible and undesirable 
precedents from cases that are never able to be reviewed. 
4. Substitution Recognizes Defendants’ Families’ 
Interests 
Substitution also protects defendants’ families. First, 
because it does not uphold the conviction without review, it 
allows families the chance to preserve the family name.203 Second, 
it prevents defendants’ families from becoming unnecessarily 
vulnerable in subsequent civil proceedings.204 If the substitutive 
appeal is successful, the defendant’s conviction vacates, making 
it more difficult—though not impossible—for third parties to 
prevail against the estate in civil proceedings.205  
Substitution also ensures that defendants’ families are 
not forced to unjustly enrich victims or the State with the 
estate’s assets, which would be allocated to the heirs of the 
estate.206 Consider what could have resulted in Mmahat if 
substitution had been permitted.207 If a party had substituted in 
the appellate proceedings to seek a final ruling on Mmahat’s 
guilt or innocence, it is possible the appeal would have been 
successful and the estate would not have been forced to pay 
restitution. When such appeals are successful, the court should 
abate the conviction and the restitution order (as in the model 
  
 200 State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. 1988). 
 201 Id.  
 202 Cf. Razel, supra note 8, at 2210 (noting courts’ interest in efficiency). 
 203 See State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65, 67 (La. 1976) (“[T]he surviving family 
has an interest in preserving, unstained, the memory of the deceased defendant or his 
reputation.”).  
 204 See United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 205 This is because there is no longer any proof of a conviction.  
 206 Surland v. State, 895 A.2d 1034, 1049 (Md. 2006). See supra Part I.C. 
 207 United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 91-93 (5th Cir. 1997) (where 
brothers misappropriated funds of a financially insured institution).  
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statute) to ensure that no party “enjoy[s] the fruits of an 
untested conviction.”208  
5. Substitution Recognizes Insurance Providers’ 
Interests  
Substitution could also benefit insurers by protecting 
them from erroneous payments and unnecessary litigation they 
might otherwise be subjected to if abatement or refusal to 
abate were applied.209 Common civil proceedings with liability 
insurers highlight this benefit. Liability insurance is “[a]n 
agreement to cover a loss resulting from the insured’s liability 
to a third party, such as a loss incurred by a driver who injures 
a pedestrian.”210 Courts allow substitution in the civil context; 
courts recognize the need for the litigation to continue on a 
party’s death and recognize that a party’s death does not 
render the claim moot.211  
Consider People v. Schaefer, mentioned at the beginning 
of this note.212 In 2010, a jury convicted Schaefer for murdering 
a nine-year-old girl, in the second-degree, as a result of his 
drunk driving. Schaefer also injured the girl’s father, 
necessitating the amputation his leg; Schaefer’s actions cost the 
victims’ family more than $1.3 million dollars in medical (among 
other) expenses. Along with Schaefer’s conviction, the court 
ordered restitution to the family to cover their expenses. 
Schaefer appealed his conviction, but died while the appeal was 
pending.213 California followed the rule of strict abatement ab 
initio (where absolutely everything from the inception of the 
case is abated, including restitution), and so the court abated 
Schaefer’s conviction and the restitution order.214 Because “[a] 
victim restitution order requires a conviction for a crime that 
caused the victim’s loss,”215 without any “specific statute 
  
 208 United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 209 C.f. State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967, 969 (Haw. 1995) (“[T]he abated 
conviction cannot be used in any related civil litigation.”), opinion after reinstatement of 
appeal, 927 P.2d 419 (Haw. 1996). 
 210 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 873 (9th ed. 2009). 
 211 For example, in Broyle v. Eagle Picher Industries, 123 F.R.D. 230 (M.D. La 
1988) (where the court held that it was proper for a deceased man’s wife to substitute 
in the products liability action initiated by that man after his death).  
 212 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (2012). See Introduction, supra.  
 213 Id. at 498. 
 214 Id. at 499-501. More recently, the court has left open the possibility of 
posthumous appeals. See People v. Her, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 977, 978 n.1 (App. Ct. 2013). 
 215 Id. at 501. 
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expressing the contrary,” the court was compelled to abate both 
the conviction and the restitution order.216 
The court did not acknowledge the effect this abatement 
would have on primary or collateral parties involved. Without the 
restitution order to the family, it is plausible that the victim’s 
insurance company (or worse, the victim’s family) will have to 
satisfy this debt without the possibility of indemnification.217  
Also consider the consequences that might arise if the 
driver’s insurance company has to compensate the defendant’s 
estate for the defendant’s wrongdoing. Insurance companies 
hire underwriters to determine the potential risk of each client, 
which determines the premiums clients must pay to the insurer 
to assume the risk of harm.218 Insurance does not account for 
“moral hazard” or any other intentional wrongdoing by the 
insured.219 Moral hazard becomes a problem when individuals 
who “are or have been affected by a contract of insurance [fail] 
to uphold the accepted moral qualities.”220 When a conviction 
abates there is no longer legal proof that the action was a 
“moral hazard” because all proceedings, including the 
indictment, vacate.221 This may force the insurance company to 
allocate funds to conduct its own investigation to prove that 
recovery should not be afforded because without a conviction 
the insurer, as subrogee, cannot automatically recover these 
funds—to the extent that the defendant’s estate has these 
funds—from the defendant’s estate.  
Substitution, however, would allow the insurance 
company the opportunity to seek indemnification from the 
defendant’s estate with the same likelihood of recovery as if the 
defendant were still alive. 
E. Who Should be Allowed to Substitute in Appellate 
Proceedings? 
As indicated in the model statute, substitution should 
be permitted to any interested third party as long as the 
  
 216 Id.  
 217 Currently, there have been no civil motions filed by any parties. 
 218 Joni Woloniecki, The Duty of Utmost Good Faith in Insurance Law: Where 
Is It in the 21st Century?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 63, 63-64 (2002). 
 219 “Moral hazard [is] any personal habit or activity of the insured that would 
cause him to be something less than a standard risk for insurance.” Baker, supra note 
99, at 1403. 
 220 EDWIN J. FAULKNER, HEALTH INSURANCE 327 (1960).  
 221 See United States v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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substitution is filed in a timely manner.222 The model statute 
allows for an additional 180 days to file the substitutive appeal 
because of the complications and delays that the defendant’s 
death may cause. Defendants’ estates, families, and insurers 
can all have interests in a final review of the deceased’s 
conviction. The list of parties that could have an interest in 
final review of this kind of case is not finite because there could 
be a greater public interest at stake. Because of this greater 
public interest, the deceased’s private attorney or public 
defender or any other legitimately interested party should be 
allowed to substitute in the appellate proceedings; this would 
not violate the rights or interests of any other party.223 
For example, in Gartland v. State, after the court 
charged the defendant with reckless manslaughter of her 
husband, she died while her appeal was pending.224 At trial, the 
defendant had claimed self-defense against her husband’s 
brutal abuse.225 The court allowed a substitute to pursue the 
appeal because the state had a “strong commitment to the 
eradication of domestic violence[,] . . . murder[,] and other 
offenses committed with guns.”226 Effectively, the court 
recognized that setting a precedent like this without allowing 
any opportunity for review could lead to a slippery slope that 
would hinder the effort to eradicate domestic violence and to 
change how it is handled in the courts. This potential effect 
necessitated the case’s review and negated the possibility of the 
appeal immediately becoming moot when the defendant died. 
The court held there was an important balance to strike and 
“interests of the defendant or society at large may be at stake if 
an erroneous conviction is left standing.”227  
By making substitution permissible rather than 
mandatory, no party is unwillingly burdened.228 Permissible 
  
 222 In Hawaii, for example, if interested parties make a timely motion for the 
defendant’s appeal of right the reviewing court has the discretion to “(1) dismiss the 
appeal as moot, vacate the original judgment of conviction, and dismiss all related 
criminal proceedings, or, in the alternative, (2) enter such other order as the appellate 
court deems appropriate pursuant to [Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure].” State v. 
Makaila, 897 P.2d 967, 972 (Haw.), opinion after reinstatement of appeal, 927 P.2d 419 
(Haw. 1995). Cf. Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 794 (Va. 2011); State v. 
Devin, 142 P.3d 599, 599-603, 605-06 (Wash. 2006).  
 223 See State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752, 765-66 (Alaska 2011), State v. Gartland, 
694 A.2d 564, 568 (N.J. 1997). 
 224 Gartland, 694 A.2d at 568. 
 225 Id. at 569. 
 226 Id. at 568. 
 227 Id. at 569. 
 228 But see Razel, supra note 8, at 2222.  
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substitution does not require defendants’ estates to bear the 
cost of the appeal, rather it permits them the opportunity to 
embrace the costs and the appeal if they so choose. If a party 
decides to bring an appeal, that party recognizes that the 
interests of appellate review outweigh the costs of the appeal.229  
F. The Procedure and Results of Substitution 
When courts have allowed substitution, the results have 
been consistent with what would occur if the defendant lived to 
see the appeal through.230 If a third party chooses to bring an 
appeal on behalf of the deceased defendant, the party should 
file notice of appeal and pay the district clerk “all required 
fees.”231 If the substitutive appeal is successful, the conviction 
should vacate, any restitution ordered should vacate, and costs 
should be charged against the appellee subject to local rules (as 
enumerated in the model statute). This result allows defendants’ 
families to benefit from the estate’s full value, and it avoids the 
unjust enrichment of third parties.232  
Alternatively, if the substitutive appeal is unsuccessful, 
the court should affirm the conviction, enforce the restitution, 
and “tax” costs “to the appellant” (subject to local rules).233 This 
result does not harm defendants’ families because the deceased’s 
estate is a product of the deceased.234 The estate should pay all 
fines and restitution rightly owed by the defendant. To order 
otherwise would unjustly enrich the estate and its 
beneficiaries.235 It is fair to satisfy a restitution order using funds 
from the defendant’s estate because the beneficiaries of the 
estate would not benefit from those funds had the defendant 
lived to see the appeal through.236 Substitution produces the 
  
 229 See FED. R. APP. P. 3. The Federal Rules mandate that “[u]pon filing a 
notice of appeal, the appellant must pay the district clerk all required fees. The district 
clerk receives the appellate docket fee on behalf of the court of appeals.” Id. If the 
appellant believes the costs outweigh the benefits of bringing the appeal, the appellant 
may simply choose to abstain from filing the appeal. Id. 
 230 Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 39. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 (2011). 
 233 Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 39. 
 234 An estate is “[t]he amount, degree, nature, and quality of a person’s 
interest in land or other property.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (9th ed. 2009).  
 235 See United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 423 n.16 (5th Cir. 
2004); United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (noting the 
possibility that abatement would unjustly enrich the defendant’s estate but ultimately 
upholding abatement because civil proceedings may provide relief for victims).  
 236 The defendant would have satisfied the restitution from his own assets 
thereby decreasing the value of his estate. See Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d at 422-24; 
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fairest results of any current posthumous appellate procedure 
because it does not prematurely stop the trial process and dictate 
a ruling regardless of what an actual review would produce. 
G. Substitution Today  
Currently, ten states allow substitution in appellate 
proceedings after a defendant dies before exhausting his right 
to appeal.237 Jurisdictions that practice substitution acknowledge 
the defendants’ interests, the victims’ interests, and the 
collateral parties’ interests.238 Because convictions carry with 
them the possibility of collateral effects, it benefits society to 
review the merits of the criminal proceedings.239 The death of a 
defendant should not extinguish his rights or the rights of 
anyone else affected by the alleged wrongdoing.240  
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the victims’ rights movement—and with 
the purview of collateral consequences for families, insurers, 
and members of society—it is archaic and unjust to ignore the 
effect posthumous abatement has on the interests of all parties. 
Staying proceedings without review, however, ignores the due 
process rights the Constitution affords every American—
including defendants. In the absence of legislation ordering 
otherwise, courts are bound to dated principles or, alternatively, 
are constantly forced to re-question the purpose of criminal law. 
  
People v. Ekinici, 743 N.Y.S.2d 651, 655-56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002); see also Lay, 456 F. 
Supp. 2d at 871 (United States’ opposition). 
 237 In recent years a growing minority of courts have adopted this rationale 
and abandoned the archaic practice of abatement ab initio. See, e.g., State v. Clements, 
668 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1996); State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967 (Haw.), opinion after 
reinstatement of appeal, 927 P.2d 419 (Haw. 1995); State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130, 133 
(Idaho 2005) (citing Ekinici, 743 N.Y.S.2d 651); People v. Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160 
(Mich. 1995); State v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996, 1000-05 (N.M. 1997); State v. Hoxsie, 570 
N.W.2d 379, 379-82 (S.D. 1997); State v. Christensen, 886 P.2d 533, 536-37 (Utah 
1993); Perry v. State, 575 A.2d 1154 (Del. 1990). 
 238 See, e.g., State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Ohio 1987); see also 
supra note 52. 
 239 State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Wis. 1988). 
 240 See Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 793 (Va. 2011); see also 
Wheat v. State, 907 So. 2d 461, 463-64 (Ala. 2005) Here, the court noted the current 
trend for courts to abolish abatement ab initio and embrace substitution. The court 
stated, “We expect this trend will continue as the courts and public begin to appreciate 
the callous impact such a procedure necessarily has on the surviving victims of violent 
crime.” Id. Despite this, the court declined to adopt substitution and upheld abatement 
ab initio, but ordered that the record reflect that the conviction was abated because of 
the defendant’s death. Id. 
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A statute permitting substitution—like the model statute set 
forth in this note—is the only remedy that adequately addresses 
the rights of all interested parties. Substitution affords 
defendants appellate review without forcing untested re-
victimization, or initial collateral-victimization, on any party. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
Table 1
Jurisdictions that Apply Strict Abatement Ab Initio 
Jurisdiction
Fifth Circuiti
Sixth Circuitii
Seventh Circuitiii
Eighth Circuitiv
Ninth Circuitv
Tenth Circuitvi
Eleventh Circuitvii
Arizonaviii
Coloradoix
District of Columbiax
Illinoisxi
Louisianaxii
Mainexiii
Missourixiv
Nebraskaxv
New Yorkxvi
Rhode Islandxvii
Tennesseexviii
Wyomingxix
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Table 2
Other Jurisdictions that Currently Abate 
Jurisdiction Special Rules
Second Circuit  Abatement ab initio with the possibility that 
restitution orders would be upheld if the facts of 
the case demand itxx 
Third Circuit Abatement ab initio when a defendant dies after 
“filing an appropriate appeal”; restitution orders 
may not be appealedxxi 
D.C. Circuit Abatement ab initio even when the defendant is 
guilty by reason of plea as long as defendant has 
made a timely appeal of his conviction prior to his 
deathxxii 
California Defendant’s death abates further proceedings of 
the case but the appellate court may exercise its 
discretion and hear the appealxxiii 
Indiana Abatement ab initio; arguably the court has left the 
possibility of a different disposition if there is a 
greater public interest at stakexxiv 
Iowa Abatement ab initio with the possibility of a 
different disposition if there is a greater public 
interest at stakexxv 
Massachusetts Abatement ab initio for direct appeals; refusal to 
abate for subsequent appealsxxvi 
Pennsylvania Each time the court has addressed this issue it has 
abated, but it has determined the merits of appeals 
that were filed before the defendant’s deathxxvii 
South Dakota Abatement ab initio, but if the defendant was 
guilty as a result of a plea and did not claim a “trial 
court error or abuse of discretion in his judgment of 
conviction” the conviction stands and the appeal 
abatesxxviii 
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Table 3
Jurisdictions that Currently Refuse to Abate 
Jurisdiction Special Rules
Fourth Circuit There is no “litigable interest” to seek reversal of 
the conviction; all penal judgments abate; 
restitution orders do not automatically abatexxix 
Georgia When the appellant dies the appeal is dismissedxxx 
Idaho Conviction, and orders for payment of court costs, 
fees, and restitution are upheld; orders for 
incarceration are abatedxxxi 
Michigan Conviction is upheld; compensatory restitution may 
be enforcedxxxii 
Montana Appeal is dismissed as mootxxxiii
New Hampshire Appeal abatesxxxiv
North Carolina Appeal abatesxxxv
Oklahoma Appeal abatesxxxvi
Oregon Appeal abates as per the State’s rules of appellate 
procedurexxxvii 
South Carolina Appeal abates and substitution is explicitly not 
permittedxxxviii  
Texas Appeal abates for lack of jurisdictionxxxix
Utah Conviction does not abate; penal orders abate; 
appeals regarding compensatory restitution orders 
do not abatexl 
Virginia Appeal rendered mootxli
 
  
2013] BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 1742 
Table 4
Jurisdictions that Currently Allow Substitutive Appeals 
Jurisdiction Special Rules
Alaska The deceased’s estate may, within reasonable time, 
move to proceed with the appeal; if no movement 
for substitution is made, the conviction is upheldxlii 
Florida If the State or a representative of the defendant 
shows “good cause” the appellate court may 
determine that the appeal should be heardxliii 
Hawaii The appellate court has the discretion to hear a 
substitutive appeal if a “proper party-defendant” 
files a motion for substitution “within a reasonable 
time after death”xliv 
Kansas The right to appeal is integral to the judicial 
process so it must be permitted even after a 
defendant’s death, especially if there is a greater 
public interest at stakexlv 
Maryland If the defendant elected to appeal but died before 
the final disposition of the appeal, the defendant’s 
estate (and only his estate) may elect to pursue the 
appeal so long as the substitution is made in a 
timely mannerxlvi 
Mississippi State may file a motion to name a substitute as 
party appellant; any party may make a timely 
filing for substitutive appeal in the casexlvii 
New Jersey A defendant’s legal representative or other 
collateral victim may pursue the appealxlviii 
New Mexico The appellate court has the discretion to appoint a 
substitute in the appellate process where “(1) the 
remaining parties have not tendered a motion for 
substitution, (2) where the court determines that 
continuing the appeal will not prejudice the rights 
or interests of the deceased, and (3) where 
concluding the appeal would be in the best 
interests of the decedent’s estate, the remaining 
parties, or society”xlix 
Ohio Either an appointed representative of the 
decedent’s estate or the State may make a timely 
motion for a substitutive appeal pursuant to the 
State’s appellate rules of procedurel 
Washington Court is permitted to hear the merits of a criminal 
appeal if “doing so is warranted”; court may abate 
financial penalties that are owed to the government 
if such penalties would risk “unfairly burdening the 
defendant’s heirs”; restitution orders to victims do 
not abateli  
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Table 5
Other Jurisdictionslii 
Jurisdiction Special Rules
Supreme Court of 
the United States 
Petitions for certiorari are dismissedliii
First Circuit The circuit court has not adressed the issue but one 
district court within the circuit has adopted 
abatement ab initio and held that fines paid before 
the defendant’s death must be returned to the 
defendant’s estateliv 
Alabama The appeal is abated and the appellate court must 
“instruct the trial court to place in the record a 
notation stating that the fact of the defendant’s 
conviction removed the presumption of the 
defendant’s innocence, but that the conviction was 
appealed and it was neither affirmed nor reversed 
on appeal because the defendant died while the 
appeal of the conviction was pending and the 
appeal was dismissed”lv 
Connecticut The court has never explicitly adopted a practice to 
follow when a defendant dies while his appeal is 
pending lvi 
Kentucky The court recognizes that the death of a defendant 
renders a case moot as to that defendant but that 
there could be other consequences to third parties; 
in the most recent case presented to the court the 
possibility of collateral consequences was strictly 
academic and the court has refused to decide a 
disposition regarding the hypothetical collateral 
consequenceslvii 
Minnesota The state has not adopted the abatement 
doctrinelviii 
Wisconsin If defendant dies while pursuing an appeal the 
appeal may be heardlix 
 
 
 
                                                
 i See United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 ii United States v. Toney, 527 F.2d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 1975). 
 iii See United States v. Bowler, 537 F. Supp. 933, 936 (N.D. Ill 1982); United 
States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 iv United States v. Morton, 635 F.2d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 v United States v. Rich, 603 F.3d 722, 731 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 vi United States v. Rice, 303 Fed. Appx. 581, 582 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 vii United States v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 viii State v. Griffin, 592 P.2d 372, 373 (Ariz. 1979). 
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 ix People v. Lipira, 621 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Colo. 1980). 
 x Howell v. U.S., 455 A.2d 1371, 1373 (D.C. 1983). 
 xi People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662, 664 (Ill. 1999). 
 xii State v. Thom, 438 So. 2d 208, 208 (La. 1983). 
 xiii State v. Carter, 299 A.2d 891, 895 (Me. 1973). 
 xiv State v. West, 630 S.W.2d 271, 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). 
 xv State v. Campbell, 193 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Neb. 1972). 
 xvi People v. Craig, 585 N.E.2d 783, 788 (N.Y. 1991). 
 xvii State v. Marzilli, 303 A.2d 367, 368 (R.I. 1973). 
 xviii Carver v. State, 398 S.W.2d 719, 720-21 (Tenn. 1966). 
 xix State v. Free, 260 P. 173, 173 (Wyo. 1927). 
 xx United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 xxi U.S. v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 295 (3d. Cir. 2001). 
 xxii United States v. Pogue, F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 xxiii People v. Her, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 977, 978 n.1 (App. Ct. 2013). Here, the 
defendant appealed his conviction but died before the disposition of the appeal. The 
court held that a “[d]efendant’s death during the pendency of the appeal abates all 
further proceedings of the case” but that the court was able to “exercise [its] inherent 
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